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I. INTRODUCTIONO N April 8, 1993 the Honorable Robert McGregor, Circuit Judge
for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, amended a Sep-
tember 30, 1992 permanent injunction' which enjoined pro-life dem-
1. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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696 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:695
onstrators from embarking on a calculated siege of various Florida
abortion clinics. 2 The mission of the pro-life demonstrators was sim-
ple: shut down the abortion clinics. Their tactics ranged from physical
intimidation of clinic doctors and employees to non-violent picketing
on the sidewalk and street immediately adjacent to the clinics.' Judge
McGregor's April 8 injunction established two buffer zones around
the Aware Woman Center for Choice located in Melbourne, Florida,
and one buffer zone around the homes of the clinic's workers and
owners.
4
Members of Operation Rescue,5 other associated organizations, and
all persons acting in concert with them, were enjoined from engaging
in specific disruptive activities near the clinic and near the homes of
clinic employees. 6 Specifically, the amended injunction established a
thirty-six foot buffer zone around the clinic's property line, and a 300-
foot zone around the residences of the clinic's employees, staff, own-
ers, or agents, which effectively banned communication by Operation
Rescue within these zones. 7 The injunction also created a 300-foot
zone around the clinic which prohibited Operation Rescue volunteers
from physically approaching any person seeking its services unless
such people indicated a desire to communicate.,
2. See infra Part III(A-B); see infra note 4.
3. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
4. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 676-82 (Fla. 1993).
The amended injunction is set forth in an appendix to the Florida Supreme Court's decision.
5. Operation Rescue was founded by Randall Terry in the mid-1980's. Among other activ-
ities, this and other related organizations physically blocked access to abortion clinics to prevent
entrance by patients and medical staff. Operation Rescue members, who directly model their
tactics after those used in the 1960's civil-rights movement, use sit-ins, picketing, and sometimes
illegal harassment. Members believe it is important to "rescue" fetuses and structure their activi-
ties to promote this objective.
In 1990, faced with escalating legal debts and a large monetary judicial judgment against his
organization, Terry closed the national headquarters. However, the 125 local affiliates continued
their efforts to shut down abortion clinics. Today, the organized abortion movement is orches-
trated through a decentralized network of regional organizations. Operation Rescue National,
Rescue America, the Pro-Life Coalition, the Pro-Life Action League, and the American Life
League represent a small portion of anti-abortion groups active in the United States today. These
smaller decentralized organizations, with minimal assets, may limit the effectiveness of recent
federal and state abortion clinic protection laws. Designed to fine the organizations responsible
for clinic harassment, such laws may prove to be ineffective against an organization without
assets. See, e.g., Joan Biskupie, High Court Rules U.S. Civil Rights Law Cannot Bar Antiabor-
tion Blockades, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at Al; Charles E. Shepard, Operation Rescue's
Mission to Save Itself Legal Challenges, Leadership Changes Reshape Militant Antiabortion
Force, WASH. PosT, Nov. 24, 1991, at Al; John Kendall, Debt Forcing Operation Rescue to
Close National Office, Leader Says, L.A. Tniars, Feb. 1, 1990, at B9.
6. See Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d at 676-82.
7. Id. at 679.
8. Id.
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This Note will examine this injunction and the conflict it sought to
resolve between a woman's constitutional right to choose abortion
and the First Amendment right to free speech. This Note also will re-
view and analyze the recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,9 and compare it with the
conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Before beginning this analysis, a note of introduction. In our nation
today, few issues are as divisive as abortion. Everyone has an opin-
ion,'0 but no one has yet offered the nation a solution that is accepta-
ble to a majority of the people. This problem is magnified by the
various leaders who parade before the media in an attempt to gain
exposure and support for their position. Patricia Ireland, President of
the National Organization for Women, labels Operation Rescue lead-
ers as terrorists." In contrast, Randall Terry, founder of Operation
Rescue, labels doctors who perform abortions as baby killers. 2 This
Note attempts to rise above the fray, if possible, and analyze the mer-
its of issues presented in this interesting case where the right of free
speech and the right of privacy collide.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that free speech is
essential to the continued vitality of a nation. 3 Our nation has recog-
nized the usefulness of the "marketplace of ideas,' ' 4 where good and
bad thoughts are exposed so that they may stand on their strengths
9. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
10. Even Justice Clarence Thomas, who gained fame at his nomination hearing by profess-
ing to have no opinion on this subject, has formed an opinion on the abortion debate. His view
on abortion closely parallels Justice Scalia's opinions in such noted abortion cases as Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) and Bray v. Alexandria Wom-
en's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
11. Patricia Ireland, Abortion Rights, 2 FLA. ST. U. J. oF PROOREssrvE LEGAL THOUGHT 2
(1993); see also, David Van Biema, In Your Town, In Your Face, TME, July 19, 1993, at 29
(pro-life demonstrators labelled "thugs"); Ike Flores, 'Wanted' Posters Target Doctors, MiAmi
HERALD, May 10, 1992 at B5 (President of Florida Abortion Council calls the people involved in
Operation Goliath "terrorists.").
12. Christine Spolar, Abortion Foes Arrested at Clinic, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1992, at BI;
see also, Flores, supra note 11, at B5 (calling doctors and clinik operators "mass murderers,"
and text of "wanted" posters stating physicians who perform abortions "kill unborn children
for a fee"); Deborah Sharp, 'Boot Camp' Takes Abortion Battle to Florida City, USA TODAY,
Feb. 1, 1993, at A2 (reporting that one reverend considers abortion doctors "killers and murder-
ers").
13. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
14. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989).
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and fall on their weaknesses.' 5 Because one purpose of free speech is
to invite dispute,' 6 any action limiting this exchange of ideas may be
viewed with suspicion as it might work to "chill" free expression. A
system of prior restraint of expression bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutionality, and places a substantial burden on the
government to justify the imposition of such restraint.'
7
Courts have held that prior restraints on speech are the most serious
and least tolerated infringements on First Amendment rights.' 8 Opera-
tion Rescue has maintained that the pro-life movement's actions are a
form a political speech protected by the First Amendment; 9 asserting
that members should be allowed to exercise their First Amendment
free speech rights first and then be punished second for any illegal acts
according to the criminal laws of a particular state. 2 The organization
also contends that its members should not be presumptively barred
from a particular area, especially when this area is a traditional public
forum with a heavy concentration of the people they view as their in-
tended audience .21 Thus, Operation Rescue believes these buffer zone
injunctions, and the injunction as applied to the Aware Woman Cen-
ter for Choice, constitute an unconstitutional infringement on free
speech rights.?
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized that, under
the United States Constitution, the right to choose abortion is a fun-
damental and constitutionally protected right?3 While some may de-
bate just how fundamental this right is, especially in the aftermath of
the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey deci-
15. The concept that the First Amendment protects this nation's "marketplace of ideas"
has been used to argue and support conduct ranging from flag burning, Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 418 (1989), to the use of "dirty" words on the radio, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
16. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
17. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
18. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
19. N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1362-63 (2d Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing that some actions of Randall Terry and other pro-life activists are "clearly ... a form of
political speech protected by the First Amendment").
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In Martin, a municipal ordinance forbid-
ding any person to knock on doors, ring doorbells, or summon the occupants of a residence for
the purpose of distributing handbills was held invalid under the Constitution. The ordinance,
which applied to a person distributing advertisements for a religious meeting, denied this person
both the freedom of speech and press. Id. at 142, 149. Madsen and Operation Rescue make a
similar argument in this case. See infra Part V(E).
23. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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sion, it nonetheless does have constitutional protection.2 The Su-
preme Court of Florida has also held that, under the state
constitution, the right to choose abortion is a fundamental right.
2
1
States have a significant interest in ensuring that the constitutional
rights of one group are not sacrificed to promote the constitutional
rights of another36 Therefore, when sufficient proof at a judicial
hearing demonstrates that the rights of one group (in this case the pa-
tients and employees of the Aware Woman Center for Choice) are
being flagrantly abused by the harassing and intimidating means of
another group (the pro-life movement), constitutional restrictions on
their freedom to speak are permissible.
27
Thus, the lines were drawn in this conflict, and both sides began to
"dig in" and prepare for a battle in the courts. Soldiers of the pro-life
movement began to dig their foxholes with a copy of the First Amend-
ment in their back pocket. They premised their argument on the long
history of First Amendment jurisprudence while attempting to avoid
the specific factual evidence at hand, which all agreed demonstrated
harassing tactics. 21 Warriors of the pro-choice camp began to dig their
trench line armed with a copy of Roe v. Wade29 and Casey30 and a
woman's constitutional guarantee to choose an abortion. Realizing
that they must tread lightly through the First Amendment traditions
of public forums and prior restraints on speech, the pro-choice camp
supported its position with cannon-barrels full of specific facts whose
purpose was to blow holes through the pro-life First Amendment posi-
tion. Because the facts of this case were so important to the pro-
choice position, a detailed review is necessary.
24. The Casey decision, 112 S. Ct. 2971 (1992), rambles for 94 pages. The decision affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded a Third Circuit decision. Essentially, Casey holds that
the doctrine of stare decisis requires reaffirmation of the essential holding from Roe that a
woman has a right to choose, without undue interference from the state, to have an abortion
prior to fetus viability. Id. at 2804. Additionally, the state has legitimate interests from the out-
set of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may
become a child. Id.
25. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192-93 (Fla. 1989); FLA. CoNsT. art I, § 23.
26. N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1364 (2d Cir. 1989); Pro-
Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1433 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
27. See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (1993) ("While the
First Amendment confers on each citizen a powerful right to express oneself, it gives the picketer
no boon to jeopardize the health, safety, and rights of others.").
28. Neither side of this conflict disputes that the conduct of the pro-life demonstrators is
harassing. Their differences revolve around whether the injunction constitutionally limits this
conduct or unconstitutionally restricts content-specific speech.
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-injunction and Early Injunction History
The abortion debate has long plagued the Central Florida and Mel-
bourne area. Patricia Baird-Windle, founder of the Aware Woman
Center for Choice, has been the target of pro-life supporters since
1977. 31 In fact, the Aware Woman Center for Choice had been pick-
eted by pro-life activists, numbering from several up to hundreds, be-
fore its Cocoa Beach opening in September 1977.32 After the opening
of the Melbourne clinic-and the two other clinics that Baird-Windle
owns-staff reported harassing phone calls, multiple fake phone calls,
fake appointments, and mass protest calls which tied up the clinics'
phone lines. 33 In late 1984, the Melbourne clinic staff reported several
bomb threats that required building evacuation and inspection3 4 and
the evacuation to an adjacent parking lot of several patients undergo-
ing surgery. 35 The harassment techniques continued throughout the
1980s, and in the spring of 1989 more than 300 pro-life activists tres-
passed onto the clinic's property and blockaded the clinic doors.36 The
blockade lasted three to four hours and resulted in the arrest of 143
demonstrators.
7
In late 1990, Bruce Cadle of Palm Bay, Florida announced the for-
mation of Operation Goliath, whose stated intent was to close the
Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne.38 This event repre-
sented a turning point in the abortion battle in the Melbourne area.
What previously had been a few significant protests each year was
soon to become an intense effort to shut down this and other Central
Florida clinics.
Members of Operation Goliath began photographing and videotap-
ing patients as they entered and exited the Aware Woman Center for
Choice.39 They then obtained the addresses of these people from the
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles and mailed them
pro-life literature. 4° In February 1991, Operation Goliath members be-
31. See Sharp, supra note 12, at A2.
32. Affidavit of Edward Windle, Appellants' Appendix, at 101, Operation Rescue v. Wom-
en's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No. 93-00969).
33. Id.
34. Id.







gan to picket the homes of Edward Windle and Dr. Carlos Arrogante,
a physician employed by the clinic.4 Despite a May 1991 ordinance
prohibiting residential picketing, this form of protest continued for
more than two years. 42 In March 1991, sixteen adults and two juven-
iles used bicycle locks to attach themselves in groups to the doors of
the clinic, preventing egress from and ingress into the clinic for three
to four hours. 43 During 1990 and 1991, pro-life demonstrations ranged
in size from one person to a group of twenty."4 Demonstrators, or
"sidewalk counselors," normally positioned themselves in the middle
of the parking lot entrance to slow entering vehicles to a speed at
which written and verbal information could be passed through car
window openings .41
In the fall of 1991, the abortion battle in Central Florida began to
attract national attention. After a six week Operation Rescue cam-
paign in Wichita dubbed the "Summer of Mercy," the national lead-
ers of Operation Rescue turned their focus to Central Florida.6 On
October 6, 1991, more than 10,000 people demonstrated in a peaceful
protest against abortion in Orlando. 47 After helping orchestrate the
Wichita protests, Operation Rescue leader and Boca Raton resident
Reverend Pat Mahoney returned to Florida and began speaking at lo-
cal churches.4" More than 20,000 pro-life fliers, stating "the spirit of
Wichita comes to Florida," and announcing meetings and upcoming
demonstrations, were distributed in the local communities. 9 These fli-
ers made specific references to conducting an October 26 abortion
clinic demonstration, labeled a "rescue." 0 Patricia Baird-Windle and
other abortion clinic owners responded to these fliers by filing suit
against Operation Rescue, Operation Rescue America, Operation Go-
liath, and their individual leaders, seeking an injunction to prohibit
these organizations from engaging in certain activities against local
41. Id. at 103.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 104.
45. Id.
46. See Mike Oliver, Police Prepare for Clash with Abortion Protestors, ORLANDO SENT.,
Oct. 20, 1991 at BI.
47. Id. at B5.
48. Id. at BI.
49. Appendix to Appellee's Initial Brief at 15-16, Operation Rescue v. Women's Health
Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No. 81,905). This appendix contains examples of two
fliers that were distributed in the Central Florida community.
50. Id. at 15-16, 24. Included in the advertisements were letters sent to local radio stations
announcing meeting and protest times.
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abortion clinics, their patients and employees." On October 25, 1991,
the circuit court entered an order granting a temporary injunction that
imposed a number of restrictions on the demonstrators. 2 While no
one violated the October 25 temporary injunction, the Women's
Health Center" filed suit seeking a permanent injunction.
National newspapers covered the harassment activities at the Mel-
bourne clinic, using it as an example of the nationwide Operation Res-
cue goal to deter doctors from performing abortion services. 4 In one
article, Dr. Frank Snydle, who performed abortions at the Melbourne
clinic, claimed that members of Operation Goliath punctured his tires,
poured barbecue sauce on his car, called his 80 year-old mother to tell
her that her son is a murderer, smashed windows in his girlfriend's
car, and picketed his home." As a result of this type of behavior, four
doctors in Melbourne stopped performing abortions during 1991.56 It
soon became apparent that the strategy of frightening doctors away
from performing abortions, which of course would eliminate a wom-
51. Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 26, Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Cir., Inc.,
626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No. 81,905). Copies of the verified motion for a temporary restrain-
ing order, the temporary restraining order, and the amended permanent restraining order are on
file at the Supreme Court of Florida.
52. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 n.l (Fla. 1993).
The temporary restraining order placed the following restrictions on Operation Rescue, Opera-
tion Rescue America, Operation Goliath, and individually named leaders:
1. All Respondents, the officers, directors, agents, representatives of Respondents,
and all other persons, known and unknown, acting on behalf of any Respondents, or
in concert with them, in any manner or by any means, are hereby enjoined and re-
strained from:
a. trespassing on, sitting on, blocking, or obstructing ingress into or egress from any
facility in which abortions are performed or family planning services are provided in
the County of Brevard and Seminole, and surrounding counties, State of Florida, of
any person seeking access to or leaving those facilities;
b. physically abusing persons entering, leaving, working at or using any services at
any facility in which abortions are performed or family planning services are pro-
vided, in the County of Brevard and Seminole, and surrounding counties, State of
Florida;
c. attempting or directing others to take any of the actions described in paragraphs
a) and b);
2. Nothing in this court's order should be construed to limit Respondents' exercise of
their legitimate First Amendment rights, such as, but not limited to, carrying signs,
singing, and praying, in a manner which does not violate a), b) and c) above.
53. The Women's Health Center, Inc., Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc., EPOC
Clinic, Inc., and Central Florida Women's Health Organization collectively requested injunctive
relief.
54. Mimi Hall, Abortion Foes Target Doctors: Goal is to Ruin Business, USA TODAY, Feb.




an's ability to terminate her pregnancy safely, was having a significant
impact on the pro-choice movement . 7
As a result of the continual and escalating harassment in and
around the Aware Woman Center for Choice and other abortion clin-
ics, Circuit Court Judge Wallace H. Hall granted the clinic long-term
relief on September 30, 1992. This initial permanent injunction was
based on findings of facts,"8 and imposed several general restrictions
on Operation Rescue and their associates 9
This permanent injunction, however, failed to produce the results
hoped for by Patricia Baird-Windle and the other abortion clinic own-
ers. Beginning in January 1993, the national leaders of Operation Res-
57. Id. Bruce Cadle, a leader in the anti-abortion movement and an individual named in the
injunction is quoted as saying "No doctors, no industry."
58. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 n.3 (Fla. 1993).
The trial court made the following findings of facts:
2. Respondents are individuals and organizations, acting in concert, who have planned
a nationwide campaign, which they call "Operation Rescue" (hereinafter, "OPERA-
TION"), directed towards closing down abortion clinics and providers throughout the
country. Respondents' own literature states that their intention is to "Physically close
down abortion mills" by encircling them with thousands of protesters and blocking
access to the facilities. Operation Goliath is dedicated to similar principles.
5. Ed Martin and Pat Mahoney have stated an intent to prevent persons from obtain-
ing abortions in the Brevard and Seminole County area by blocking access to clinics.
6. Respondents have passed out flyers in the Central Florida area stating an intent to
close down abortion clinics in this area.
7. Respondent, Pat Mahoney, was a leader in the Wichita, Kansas protests. Respon-
dents, Ed Martin and Pat Mahoney, have made statements that there will be or may
be a blocking of the entrance to an abortion clinic in the Central Florida area. Pat
Mahoney and Martin have stated to members of the press that they intend to shut
down a clinic, and have issued a press release which states that "the spirit of Wichita
comes to Florida." The press release also contained information that the Reverend Ed
Martin of Ocala announces an "Operation Rescue" for Central Florida.
8. Literature obtained from Rescue America states that their members should ignore
the law of the State and the police officers who remove them from their blockading
positions.
59. Id. at n.4. The permanent injunction contained the following general restrictions:
A. Respondents, OPERATION RESCUE... are hereby enjoined from:
I. trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or egress
from any facility at which abortions are performed in Brevard and Seminole County,
Florida;
2. physically abusing persons entering, leaving, working or using any services of any
facility at which abortions are performed in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida;
and,
3. attempting or directing others to take any of the actions described in Paragraphs
I and 2 above.
B. Nothing in this Court's order should be construed to limit Respondents' exercise of
their legitimate First Amendment rights, such as, but not limited to, carrying signs,
singing, and praying, in a manner which does not violate [paragraphs] 1, 2, and 3
above.
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cue escalated their demonstrations in the Central Florida area, placing
the Melbourne clinic at the top of their protest list. 60 A pro-life train-
ing program was instituted in Melbourne at a time roughly coinciding
with the twentieth anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision,6' and with
the inauguration of President Clinton, a pro-choice supporter. 62 The
training classes, which one newspaper labeled "fundamentalist boot
camp, ' 63 combined Bible study with lessons in nonviolent confronta-
tion." Hosted by several local churches, the school-called the Insti-
tute of Mobilized Prophetic Activated Christian Training
(IMPACT)-instructed its students in topics ranging from the use of
scriptures to persuade abortion seekers to deliver their babies, to the
proper methods of being arrested in their efforts to stop abortions. 6
While the IMPACT classes drew only twenty-two students, ranging
in age from sixteen to sixty-seven, the psychological effect on abortion
clinic owners was great." In February, IMPACT students blocked the
driveway of a staff physician's home with a pickup truck. The doctor
was forced to drive across a neighbor's lawn to get to the street, where
he was followed to his office and picketed.67 Operation Rescue then
purchased the property across from the Aware Woman Center for
Choice and christened it their area headquarters and counseling cen-
ter. 6 The harassment continued when someone sprayed butyric acid
through the clinic's door seals and through the window seals of a doc-
tor's car.69 Thus, despite the original permanent injunction, the pro-
life movement's harassment" not only continued but intensified dur-
ing the early part of 1992.
Nearly six months after the September 30 injunction, the circuit
court held a three-day evidentiary hearing to determine if its prior res-
trictions sufficiently protected the health, safety, and ability of
women in Brevard and Seminole County to seek and receive abortion
services.71 On April 8, 1993, the circuit court amended its prior order,
60. See Sharp, supra note 12; Kurt Chandler, Operation Rescue Boot Camp, MINNEAPOLIS-
ST. PAUL STAR TRm., Apr. 18, 1993, at Al.
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. Sharp, supra note 12.






69. Id. The acid produces a rancid smell that permeated the clinic's furniture, files, and the
car's interior.
70. Brief of Operation Rescue at 4-7, Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626
So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No. 81,905).
71. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Cir., Inc., 626 So. 2d at 667.
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concluding that Operation Rescue was engaged in actions that "im-
pede and obstruct both staff and patients from entering the clinic."
7 2
B. The Amended Permanent Injunction
The amended permanent injunction prohibited Operation Rescue,
other similar organizations, named individuals, and all those acting in
concert with these organizations, from conducting general interference
with the daily activities of the Aware Woman Center for Choice. 73 It
also imposed general limitations on demonstrations and activities di-
rected at the clinic's employees, particularly around their homes. 74 The
court order reiterated the language of the previous injunction, which
prohibited the named demonstrators from entering the premises and
interfering with the ingress into and egress from the building and
parking lot.
71
More significantly, however, the amended permanent injunction es-
tablished a thirty-six foot buffer zone around the area immediately
adjacent to the Aware Woman Center for Choice. 76 On the east side
of the clinic, which abuts highway U.S. 1, this zone was reduced to
five feet and effectively placed any potential demonstrator on the
other side of the highway."7 The amended permanent injunction also
placed a 300-foot buffer zone around the clinic, which prohibited the
named demonstrators from physically approaching, without consent,
any person seeking the clinic's services. 78 Another 300-foot buffer
zone was placed around the residences of the clinic's employees, staff,
and owners. 9 Within the thirty-six-foot zone, the demonstrators, and
those acting in concert with the demonstrators, could not picket, con-
gregate, or use any sound amplification equipment.8 0 The amended in-
junction also prohibited singing, whistling, and other loud noises
within earshot or sight of the Aware Woman Center for Choice from
7:30 a.m. through noon, Mondays through Saturdays, this being the
period when the clinic performed most of its abortions. 81
72. Id. at 678. The complete text of the Amended Permanent Injunction (No. 91-2811-CA-
16-K), dated April 8, 1993, is appended to the Florida Supreme Court's decision.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Compare text of Amended Permanent Injunction, Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 678-
682, with text of original Permanent Injunction, Id. at 667.
76. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 679-80 (Fla. 1993).
77. Id. at 679.
78. Id. at 679-80.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 679.
81. Id.
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C. Florida Supreme Court Decision
Operation Rescue and the other named parties in the amended in-
junction appealed Judge McGregor's court order in both federal and
state court. s2 The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal certified the
trial court's order as a matter of great public importance requiring
immediate resolution, and forwarded the case to the Supreme Court
of Florida.83 On October 28, 1993, the Supreme Court approved
Judge McGregor's amended injunction."
In approving the order, the Supreme Court rejected Operation Res-
cue's claims that the amended injunction violated freedom of speech,
freedom of association, equal protection, and the free exercise of re-
ligion. 5 In rejecting these claims, the court found that the amended
injunction was carefully tailored to constitute "the least intrusive rem-
edy that will still be effective. ' 86 The court also held that the time,
place, and manner restrictions at issue were not content-based since
"the restrictions make no mention whatsoever of abortion or any
other political or social issue; the restrictions address only the volume,
timing, location, and violent or harassing nature of Operation Res-
cue's expressive activity. '8 7 Since the court held that the restrictions
were content-neutral, the doctrine of prior restraint was not applica-
ble.88 This finding eliminated one of Operation Rescue's major argu-
ments.
Finally, the court rejected Operation Rescue's argument that the in-
junction was unconstitutionally vague because it did not clearly delin-
eate the line between lawful and unlawful conduct.89 The court
concluded that the injunction's language was "sufficiently specific to
put Operation Rescue on notice that loud noises may not be made and
signs depicting patients' names or other images may not be displayed
... in such a manner that they would be observable to patients within
the clinic during surgery and recovery periods." 9
82. Id. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993).
83. The Supreme Court of Florida had jurisdiction on this matter, under FLA. CoxST. art.
V., § 3(b)(5), since it was certified by the district court as passing on an issue of great public
importance.
84. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
85. Id. at 675.
86. Id. at 670 (quoting Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147,
1152-53 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261
(1989)).
87. Id. at 671.
88. See id. at 674 (citing Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3rd
Cir. 1991)); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361
(Mass. 1990).
89. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 674-75.
90. Id.
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D. The Federal Decision
In a footnote at the end of its decision, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida recognized that eight days before its ruling, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had ruled that a federal
district court erred in denying an abortion opponent's request for re-
lief from the amended injunction. 91 In Cheffer v. McGregor,92 Judge
Tjoflat, Chief Judge for the Eleventh Circuit, vacated and remanded
a district court ruling which denied Cheffer's motion for a preliminary
injunction against the McGregor order. 93 While the Eleventh Circuit
panel did not rule on the constitutionality of the amended injunction,
the judges did hold that the injunction restricted anti-abortion speech
in the vicinity of the abortion clinic. 94 The Cheffer court concluded
that the injunction represented an unconstitutional prior restraint on
Ms. Cheffer's free speech rights and, thus, she had standing to chal-
lenge the injunction in federal court.95
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the injunction must be analyzed as a
viewpoint-specific restriction in a traditional public forum.9 The Elev-
enth Circuit did not find per se that the state circuit court's injunction
was unconstitutional; but, by defining on remand the logic and
method to be used by the federal district court, it nearly guaranteed a
favorable ruling for the pro-life movement.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari for Cheffer on
the same day it granted certiorari for Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.; thus, the Cheffer decision was not properly before the
Court in the Madsen decision.97 However, the conflicting holdings, es-
pecially on the content-neutral and prior restraint issues, set the scene
for the United States Supreme Court decision.
91. Id. at 676n.10.
92. 6 F.3d 705 (11 th Cir. 1993).
93. Id. at 712.
94. See id. at 710-11.
95. It is interesting to note that the federal court had to overcome a series of jurisdictional
and procedural issues before handing down its opinion. Whether Cheffer had standing and
whether the question was ripe for federal jurisdiction were two hurdles that the case had to leap.
The federal court had to distinguish Cheffer's case from a number of other cases to avoid a
problem with Younger abstention. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prohibits federal
courts from interfering in state court proceedings, "when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Id. at 43-44.
Here, the court felt that Cheffer had no remedy in state court "except to subject herself to a
criminal contempt citation." Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 709 (1 1th Cir. 1993). This is a
unique and rather narrow interpretation of the Younger abstention doctrine considering the fact
that a state supreme court decision from this same injunction was pending when the Eleventh
Circuit released its decision.
96. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 710.
97. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994).
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IV. THE MADSEN OPINION
A. The Issues Presented
During the last week of January 1994, roughly two years after Op-
eration Rescue began its IMPACT classes in the Melbourne area, the
United States Supreme Court granted review of the Florida Supreme
Court ruling in Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, Inc.98
The questions presented for review centered around the three buffer
zones. 99 Additionally, the named petitioners presented a First Amend-
ment freedom of association question reflecting their opinion that the
injunction's language prohibited them, and those acting "in concert"
with them, from freely associating with others.100
Interestingly, the petition for writ of certiorari was filed under the
names of Judy Madsen, Ed Martin, and Shirley Hobbs, and not under
"Operation Rescue, et. al." 10-1 This apparently was an attempt by the
petitioners to distance themselves from Operation Rescue, Operation
Goliath, and other organizations which the record indicated were in-
volved in an organized effort to shut down the abortion clinics.°2 Spe-
cifically, Madsen and the others presented three questions for review:
(1) Whether the state court injunction, placing a thirty-six foot buffer
zone around the abortion clinic that prohibited peaceful pro-life
speech in a traditional public forum, was an unconstitutional content-
based restriction on free speech and association; (2) Whether the state
court injunction, creating a consent requirement before speech was
permitted within the 300-foot buffer zone around the abortion clinic
and in the residential areas, was a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction or was an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech;
and (3) Whether a state court injunction prohibiting the named dem-
onstrators and those acting "in concert" from expressing peaceful
speech within several designated buffer zones violated the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and association. 10 3
98. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), cert.
granted sub noan., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 907 (Jan. 21, 1994) (No.
93-880).




102. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 666-69.
103. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516 (1994), at i.
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B. The Supreme Court's Ruling
On June 30, 1994, the Supreme Court announced its Madsen deci-
sion. 1' 4 In a 6-3 ruling, the Court held that judges may prevent dem-
onstrators from closely approaching abortion clinics to ensure access
without violating the demonstrators' First Amendment rights. 10 The
majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the
portion of the amended injunction dealing with the thirty-six foot buf-
fer zone immediately surrounding the Aware Woman Center for
Choice on Dixie Way.101 However, the Court reversed the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision on the constitutionality of the larger 300-foot
"no approach" buffer zone which surrounded the clinic, as well as
the 300-foot buffer zone surrounding the homes of the clinic's em-
ployees.107 The relatively short majority opinion was followed by a
scathing and lengthy dissent by Justice Scalia, who attacked the wis-
dom of the Court's apparent compromise.' °' Concluding that the case
established a bad precedent, Justice Scalia stated that "the Court has
left a powerful loaded weapon lying about," which, given the proper
circumstances, could be used to limit free speech and liberty in future
cases. 109
V. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Madsen majority held that a thirty-six foot buffer zone on a
public street which prohibited certain demonstrations was acceptable
under the First Amendment." 0 However, other provisions of the
amended permanent injunction, chiefly the 300-foot zones, burdened
more speech than necessary and, thus, violated the protestors' First
Amendment rights."' In upholding the thirty-six foot buffer zone es-
tablished in the injunction, the Court affirmed the Florida Supreme
Court's judgment that the injunction was content neutral, and re-
jected the pro-life's contention that a strict scrutiny standard was ap-
plicable."1 2
The Court began its analysis of the issues in Madsen by determining
the threshold question of whether the injunction was content neutral
or content based.' Realizing the importance of this issue, both the
104. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
105. Id. at 2521.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2529.
108. Id. at 2534-50.
109. Id. at 2549.
110. Id. at 2521.
111. Id. at 2529.
112. Id. at 2523-24.
113. Id.
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pro-life movement and the pro-choice movement presented strong ar-
guments supporting their respective positions. "14
A. Madsen's Content-Based Argument
Speech that is popular or pleasant has less need for constitutional
protection."5 When a citizen exercises the right to freedom of speech,
that citizen is exercising a right which the Supreme Court has charac-
terized as lying at the foundation of a free government by free peo-
ple." 6 The First Amendment is intended to "remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us.""
7
The pro-life movement asserted that the injunction directly violated
First Amendment principles since it banned all religious and pro-life
speech in a traditional public forum." 8 Under the injunction, a pro-
life speaker could never enter the public sidewalk adjacent to the clinic
for peaceful speech activities and is banned from being on Dixie Way,
the public road in front of the clinic." 9 Thus, this individual cannot
exercise his constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights. This ban, in
the view of the pro-life movement, was unconstitutional.
The area within the thirty-six foot buffer zone included a public
street and sidewalk. In determining the nature of a public forum, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that public sidewalks and streets
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public ...
and are properly considered traditional public fora. '" 12 In Madsen's
opinion, prohibiting the pro-life movement "[a]t all times on all
days" ' 2' from engaging in pro-life speech in this traditional public fo-
rum violated her freedom of speech. The amended injunction prohib-
ited a peace march along Dixie Way, prohibited a few pro-life
individuals from conversing in public on the sidewalk in front of the
clinic, and subjected them to arrest. In fact, if two individuals identi-
fied in the injunction were walking through the residential area that
surrounded the plinic, they would be forced to detour around the buf-
114. See generally Appellant's and Appellee's Briefs, Operation Rescue v. Women's Health
Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No.. 81,905).
11. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 463 n.l I (1987).
116. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
117. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991).
118. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 670.
119. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 707 (11 th Cir. 1993).
120. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
121. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 680 (Fla. 1993).
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fer zone. To take this scenario one step further, if one of these indivi-
duals was a pro-choice advocate and the other a pro-life advocate,
who was identified as "acting in concert" with' 22 the named petition-
ers, the pro-life advocate could be arrested by the police as the pro-
choice individual continued on his or her way.
While this scenario may appear unrealistic, Madsen pointed out in
her brief that pro-life picketers and demonstrators protesting the Mel-
bourne clinic were arrested for violating the injunction, while pro-
choice picketers and demonstrators, engaged in identical activity, were
not arrested. 123 Madsen argued that this disparate treatment resulted
from the content of pro-life and pro-choice speech, and indicated that
the amended injunction was tailored to limit only pro-life speech.
Madsen asserted that the amended injunction represented a content
specific governmental interference with her freedom of speech. 2 4 As
such, it acted as a prior restraint on the First Amendment rights of her
and others. Statutes, ordinances, and regulations restricting speech
trigger the traditional "time, place, and manner" analysis, 2 but in-
junctions trigger the much stricter doctrine of prior restraint. 26 The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that prior res-
traints are presumptively unconstitutional. 2 7 When dealing with ex-
pressive activities such as picketing, singing, and other forms of verbal
communicating, a court may "restrain only unlawful conduct and the
122. Id. at 679.
123. See Appellant's Appendix to Initial Brief Part 2 at 104-05, Operation Rescue v. Wom-
en's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No. 81,905). The circuit court indicated that
the intent of the order was to prohibit picketing and demonstrations by all persons who identi-
fied themselves as having pro-life beliefs. The circuit court judge also stated that those people
having pro-choice beliefs were free to be on the public sidewalk without being in violation of the
order.
Also, see the transcript of record for the hearing of April 12, 1993, where Judge McGregor,
the same judge who entered the order, stated that the order applies only to individuals with a
pro-life view. He also stated that all those with a pro-life view are automatically considered to be
acting in concert with those named in the order and therefore are subject to its restrictions.
Appellant's Appendix to Initial Brief at 105, 107, 116, 148.
124. Petitioner's Brief at 9-14, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994).
125. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ordinance); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (ordinance); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984) (regulation).
126. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per
curiam) (injunction against marches, distribution of pamphlets, and display of materials); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (injunction against publica-
tion of classified government documents); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971) (injunction against the distribution of literature); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (court order restraining public rallies and meetings).
127. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 181; Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419.
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persons responsible for conduct of that character."'' 2 Accordingly,
Madsen concluded that if injunctive remedies restricting peaceful ex-
pression in a traditional public forum also violated the doctrine of
prior restraint, these injunctions were constitutionally impermissible.
Instead of limiting the injunction to unlawful activities such as block-
ading an entrance way, the injunction went further and banned a
broad range of peaceful expressive activity.
B. The Women's Health Center's Content-Neutral Position
While the Women's Health Center agreed that public sidewalks and
rights of way are traditional public fora, they rejected the notion that
the amended injunction was content-based. 129 Furthermore, the Center
asserted that substantial First Amendment precedent supported its po-
sition that the injunction was a valid governmental attempt to protect
the ability of abortion clinics to provide medical services to women in
an environment free from interferences that endanger the health and
safety of their patients.130 The Center also pointed to the fact that the
Supreme Court has held that "the First Amendment does not guaran-
tee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in
any manner that may be desired." 3'
The Center also contended that the amended injunction did not
prohibit speech, as Operation Rescue stated, but instead provided rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions specific to the situa-
tion.3 2 Under traditional First Amendment analysis, even public fora
may be subjected to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
provided the restrictions are: (1) content neutral; (2) narrowly tailored
to serve.a significant governmental interest; and (3) leave open ample
alternative channels of communication. 
33
The Women's Health Center argued that nothing in the state
court's order limited the subject of pro-life speech nor regulated the
128. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 924 n.67 (1982).
129. Brief for Respondents at 15, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
130. See Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681
(9th Cir. 1988); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530, 533 (Ga.) (state has significant interest
in protecting health of its citizens and their right to medical services), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 75
(1991); O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 407 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1978)
(injunction against protestors furthers substantial governmental interest in the "health or safety
of any patient of the medical clinic").
131. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981).
132. See Brief for Respondent at 13, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994).
133. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
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substance of its message. 34 As support for this position, the Center
compared its situation to other abortion clinics where similar injunc-
tions recently had been upheld.'3 In Bering v. SHARE,3 6 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, faced with a similar issue, found the
following:
Although only anti-abortion picketers are bound by the geographical
restriction of picketing to Stevens Avenue [well away from the
entrance to the clinic building], that in itself cannot be viewed as
content regulation. The trial court imposed the place restriction in
order to regulate the conduct of a particular group of persons before
the court.'
In federal court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
approved an injunction which enjoined pro-life demonstrators from
protesting within twelve and one-half feet of the entrance area to an
abortion clinic, and from "producing noise by any ...means, in a
volume that substantially interferes with the provision of medical serv-
ices within the Center." ' The Ninth Circuit continued: "The prelimi-
nary injunction is not a content-based restriction of expression. It
refers not at all to the specific viewpoints that the advocates express
.... Rather, it focuses exclusively on the location and manner of ex-
pression. It protects the clinic from loudness and physical intimida-
tion, not from content of speech."' 3 9
To further support its position that the amended permanent injunc-
tion was content neutral, the Women's Health Center pointed to the
fact that the order regulated only the method by which demonstrators
conveyed their message, not the pro-life message itself. 4' First, the
order placed a restriction on the permissible noise level during certain
hours when surgical procedures, including abortions, were performed
at the Melbourne clinic. '4' The order constitutionally regulated the
place where protestors could demonstrate, but was silent on the spe-
cific content of their message. 42 Finally, the order constitutionally
134. Brief for Respondent at 22, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994).
135. Id. at 32.
136. 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986).
137. Id. at 925.
138. Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681, 687
(9th Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 686.
140. Petitioner's Brief at 16-17, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994).
141. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 707 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
142. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 671 (Fla. 1993).
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regulated the manner in which the pro-life message is communicated
by limiting the degree of very loud noise, which carried from the street
to the Aware Woman Center's interior. 43 Since nothing in the
amended injunction limited the specific content of the pro-life mes-
sage, it was a content-neutral remedy and did not act as a prior re-
straint on Operation Rescue's First Amendment freedoms.
The Women's Health Center additionally argued that the injunction
sought to regulate the secondary effects of pro-life speech.'" Under
the secondary effects rationale, the Supreme Court has held that regu-
lations curtailing certain speech and conduct may be constitutional if
the regulations do not regulate content. 145 In Boos v. Barry,'4 the Su-
preme Court struck down a District of Columbia ordinance prohibit-
ing the placing of certain signs within 500 feet of an embassy. 47
Justice O'Connor's opinion, however, contained language suggesting
several content-neutral secondary effects which might justify regula-
tion. 1 Regulations on movement, such as crowd control, ingress and
egress, and site security, are permissible.'49 For example, Justice
O'Connor suggested that it would be constitutional to prevent a dem-
onstrator from blocking the door and security camera by standing di-
'rectly in front of an embassy entrance. 50 This is the type of content-
neutral secondary effect that Judge McGregor attempted to address in
his amended injunction.' Accordingly, the Women's Health Center
contended that the injunction did not prohibit pro-life demonstrators
from protesting; rather, it was specifically tailored to ensure that
women who desired to use the Melbourne clinic's services could do so
in a safe, secure and easily accessible manner.
C. The Court's Content-Neutral Decision
In rejecting the logic behind the pro-life's position that the injunc-
tion was content-based, the Court stated that "[t]o accept petitioners'
claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as content or
viewpoint based.' ' 52 As Madsen properly pointed out, this injunction
143. Id.
144. Petitioner's Brief at 29, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
145. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1988); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
146. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
147. Id. at 320-33.
148. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 707 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
152. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994).
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applied only to a particular group and regulated this group's activities
and, to a certain degree, the group's speech.' The Court was quick to
point out, however, that this alone would not invalidate an injunc-
tion; in fact, this is the purpose of most injunctions.1 4 Here, only af-
ter the Women's Health Center asserted a violation of rights and the
court held a hearing was a remedy fashioned for a "specific depriva-
tion" of certain activities of specific groups.' Reviewing the record,
the Court concluded that "none of the restrictions imposed by the
court were directed at the contents of petitioner's message.
' ' 156
In determining the content neutrality of the injunction, the Court
applied the standard recently set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism. 5 7 If the government has adopted a regulation of speech "with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech,"' 58 it will be
deemed permissible. The threshold consideration when determining
the neutrality of the regulation is the government's purpose for the
restriction. 5 9 In Madsen's case, the amended injunction was imposed
only after repeated violations of previous injunctive remedies. 6 The
Court also concluded that, while only those with a certain view of
abortion appeared to be effected by the injunction, this alone did not
render the injunction viewpoint based.' 6 1 Because the injunction did
not restrict what the pro-life movement could say, but only regulated
conduct, the Court concluded that the injunction did not warrant a
heightened scrutiny analysis.
62
D. The Standard of Review for Injunctive Remedies
After it rejected the strict scrutiny standard and concluded that the
amended injunction was not content or viewpoint based, it appeared
the Court would apply the intermediate level analysis. This test, deter-
mining whether the time, place, and manner restrictions are "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," is an
unofficial standard which the Court would be expected to apply. 163 In
153. See supra Part V(A) and accompanying footnotes.
154. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
155. Id. at 2521.
156. Id. at 2523.
157. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
158. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
159. Id.
160. See supra Part III(A-B).
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Madsen, however, the restrictions were in place through the judicial
remedy of injunctive relief and not through a local ordinance or legis-
lative act.' Thus, while legislative restrictions on First Amendment
principles must meet the standard time, place, and manner analysis,
the Court indicated that judicial restrictions require a different stan-
dard.165 Before analyzing the Court's standard, a review of the com-
peting positions is helpful.
1. Madsen's Time, Place, Manner Argument
The state may impose reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions on expression if such restrictions are content-neutral, narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open am-
ple alternative channels of communication. 6 Paragraph five of the
injunction forbade, within 300 feet of the Aware Woman Center for
Choice,"physically approaching any person seeking the services of the
clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by ap-
proaching or by [inquiry] of the respondents." 167 Pro-life advocates
argued that this paragraph was not a reasonable time, place and man-
ner restriction because it was vague, overbroad, and not narrowly tai-
lored. 161
First, Madsen claimed that it would be impossible to identify with
any certainty those "persons seeking the services" of the Aware
Woman Center for Choice. 69 The only way of ensuring that the in-
junction was not violated would be to refrain from communication
with anyone, effectively "chilling" speech. Second, Madsen argued
that there was no reliable method to determine what the amended in-
junction meant by the phrase "approaching or by inquiry." 70 Because
these terms were subject to differing interpretations, all pro-life dem-
onstrators peacefully protesting outside the thirty-six foot buffer
zone, but within the 300-foot buffer zone, must avoid contact with
any individual or risk violating the court injunction and potential ar-
rest.
Finally, Madsen asserted that the amended injunction did not leave
open alternative channels of communication and was not narrowly
164. See supra Part II(A-B).
165. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
166. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
167. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 679-80 (Fla. 1993).
168. Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, 20-23, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516 (1994) (No. 93-880)..
169. Initial Brief for Appellants at 34, Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626
So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
170. Id. at 35.
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tailored to achieve the government's interest. 17' The least restrictive
means to achieve the government's goal of affording clinic access to
those who desired it would have been to prohibit people from entering
onto the private property of the clinic or the private parking lot of the
clinic, and would have restricted assaults on patients or workers. 72
Instead, the amended injunction left no alternative means of commu-
nicating within the thirty-six foot buffer zone because it permanently
enjoined any pro-life demonstrator acting in concert with one of the
named parties from entering this area.' 73 Unlike other ordinances,
which restricted the pro-life demonstrators but permitted a limited
number of protesters in the vicinity of a clinic, this order prohibited
all pro-life speech within a traditional public forum.'
74
2. The Women's Health Center's View
In its response to Madsen's claim that the injunction was not a
proper time, place, and manner restriction, the Women's Health Cen-
ter relied on the facts of this case. 17 5 The Center argued that the prohi-
bitions contained in the amended injunction addressed specific,
recurring incidents and were appropriate to protect a significant gov-
ernment interest.176 The order was entered after pro-life demonstrators
continued to interfere with ingress and egress at the Aware Woman
Center for Choice and engaged in other activities designed to drive
clinic patients and employees away.177 In sum, the amended injunction
moved protestors from the clinic's entrance, driveway, and parking
lot, and relocated them directly across the street. It did not bar the
protestors from demonstrating, but only prevented them from demon-
strating in a manner which conflicted with the clinic's ability to func-
tion properly.
The Women's Health Center asserted that the injunction protected
significant governmental interests. 78 First, of course, the injunction
safeguarded a woman's right to choose, a right interpreted into the
171. Initial Brief of Appellants at 28, Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626
So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (No. 81,905).
172. Id. at 29-30.
173. Id. at 28.
174. Cf. Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530, 533 (Ga.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 75
(1991).
175. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994); Operation Rescue,
626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993) (both decisions contain descriptions of the events); see also supra Part
III(A).
176. Brief for Respondents at 30-34, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
177. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at2521-23.
178. Brief for Respondents at 30-34, Madsen v. Women's Health Cir., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
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United States Constitution"9 and the Florida Constitution. 80 Because
the Aware Woman Center for Choice was the only clinic in Brevard
County that performed abortions, its continued operation was vital to
ensuring woman's right to obtain an abortion. 8 '
The right of a business owner to be free from harassing and intimi-
dating activities was a second governmental interest. 82 The state has a
valid interest in ensuring that the legal and governmental regulated
commerce in their community is free to conduct business.'83 This is
even more important when the health and welfare of the community is
at stake.'
A third government interest is public safety. 8 ' Regulating the man-
ner in which the pro-life demonstrators protest ensures their safety as
a group. The pro-life activities of marching in the street and attempt-
ing to stop vehicles by throwing themselves down as "human speed
bumps" were not consistent with public safety, 8 6 especially where, as
here, a clinic's property borders a federal highway (U.S. 1).187
The Women's Health Center answered pro-life concerns regarding
the 300-foot buffer zone by arguing that the demonstrators were free
to speak, but not free to engage in harassing conduct.' People came
to the Melbourne clinic by car. 189 This mitigated pro-life concerns re-
garding whom they could address. In a real world sense, the buffer
zone merely prevented pro-life demonstrators from attempting to stop
vehicles as they turned off U.S. 1 and onto Dixie Way to enter the
clinic's parking lot.
3. The Standard: "Burdening No More Speech Than Necessary"
The Court's standard requires that content-neutral injunctive reme-
dies that restrict speech must "burden no more speech than necessary
179. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180. InreT.W., 551 So.2d l86(Fla. 1989).
181. Brief for Respondents at 1, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
182. Id. at 4, 36-37.
183. Id. at 15, 18.
184. Id. at 33, 35-38.
185. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
650 (1981) (the government has an interest in public safety and order sufficient to justify restrict-
ing distribution of literature to an assigned location).
186. Brief for Respondents at 8, 27, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
187. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1993).
188. Brief for Respondents at 15-21, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994).
189. Id. at 4.
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to serve a significant governmental interest."' 19 This standard appar-
ently lies between the intermediate and strict scrutiny standards. 9' The
Court reasoned that the inherent difference between injunctions and
legislative ordinances justified the application of a stricter standard
for judicial remedies.' 92 Injunctions carry a greater risk of censorship
and discriminatory application than general ordinances, and may lack
the general consensus that is normally associated with legislative
acts.' 93 Thus, a "closer fit" test is required when conducting a consti-
tutional review of a court's injunction. Any restriction which proves
to be too burdensome on the pro-life movement would be an uncon-
stitutional infringement on their First Amendment rights.' 94 If, how-
ever, the injunction restricts the pro-life movement's ability only to a
degree that will ensure a significant governmental interest, there
would be no constitutional violation.
The Court applied this standard to the specific sections of the in-
junction. 9 First, it addressed the thirty-six foot buffer zone, which
prohibited protestors from entering any portion of the public right of
way within thirty-six feet of the clinic's property line. Here, the Court
reviewed the failed attempts at prior injunctive relief, specific portions
of the Florida Supreme Court's analysis, and earlier cases supporting
the expansion of an injunctive remedy when previous court action has
failed.19 The Court concluded that the thirty-six foot buffer zone
around the "clinic entrances and driveway burdens no more speech
than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake." 19
However, under a similar analysis regarding the rear and side of the
clinic, the Court concluded that the thirty-six foot buffer zone bur-
dened more speech than was necessary to protect access to the clinic,
which the Court found to be a significant governmental interest.' lg
190. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994).
191. The Court normally applies a heightened or strict scrutiny test to a content-based exclu-
sion. To pass this test, a state must demonstrate that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
pelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
The Court normally applies an intermediate level of scrutiny to a content-neutral exclusion or
First Amendment restriction. If a state's regulation is deemed content neutral, the Court will
analyze the restriction to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest, and leaves open alternative channels of communication. Id. at 45.
192. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994).
193. Id.
194. "Too burdensome" would be defined under this standard as burdening more speech
than necessary to serve a significant governmental interest.
195. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526-30.
196. Id. at 2526-27.
197. Id. at 2527.
198. Id. at 2528.
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Thus, in a clarification of its standard for deciding the constitutional-
ity of injunctive free speech restraints, the Court divided the thirty-six
foot buffer zone in two, upholding only the portion where the record
indicated that the protestors had obstructed access to the clinic.199 Be-
cause the rear and side areas of the buffer zone contained no record
of access denial, the restriction went too far in burdening the protes-
tors' First Amendment rights.
The Court's analysis of the noise level and "images observable"
provision of the injunction also demonstrated its attempt to apply a
higher, very precise level of scrutiny to analyze injunctive orders that
restrict First Amendment rights. The Court affirmed the noise level
restriction that restrained protestors from "singing, chanting, whis-
tling, shouting, [and] yelling" during the mornings when abortions
are being performed. 20° However, the Court struck down the portion
of the injunction which restricted the pro-life movement from display-
ing "images observable" inside the clinic.2 0' The Court held that the
clinic could simply put up curtains to avoid seeing the images that the
pro-life movement attempted to force on the clinic's staff and pa-
tients. 02 However, this solution, or least-restrictive remedy, could not
address the problem of noise level. Since noise control is particularly
important to hospitals and medical facilities during surgical proce-
dures, the restrictions served an important governmental interest of
ensuring safe medical assistance. 203 Thus, during these periods, the in-
junction's limitation on noise burdened "no more speech than neces-
sary to ensure the health and well-being of the patients at the
clinic." 20 In reaching this conclusion, the Court once again offered an
interesting comparison, concluding that one portion of the injunction
was valid while another, relatively similar portion, burdened more
speech than was necessary. While sight and sound restrictions would
appear to be closely related in terms of human senses, the Court, in an
apparent demonstration on exactly how precise these speech-restrict-
ing injunctions must be, distinguished the two.
The Court next addressed the 300-foot buffer zones surrounding
both the Aware Woman Center for Choice and the homes of the clin-
ic's employees. 20s Here, the Court ruled that these two zones failed to
meet the requisite higher level of scrutiny since they burdened more
199. Id. at 2530.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2528-29.
202. Id. at 2529.
203. Id. at 2528.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2529-30.
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speech than was necessary. 20 6 Based on the evidence presented in the
record, the Court found insufficient justification for the broad ban on
picketing around the homes of the clinic employees.2 07 Similarly, the
"consent" requirement which prohibited pro-life individuals from ap-
proaching persons seeking the services of the clinic was too broad. 20 8
As a result, it burdened more speech than was necessary to ensure
access to the clinic.
E. The "In Concert" With and Vagueness Questions
The final question presented for review before the Supreme Court
dealt specifically with the "in concert" with phrase of the amended
injunction. 209 Related to this question was the issue of whether the
amended injunction was vague or overbroad.
210
1. Madsen's View
Madsen and the pro-life movement contended that the amended in-
junction conflicted with the principles of free speech and the freedom
to associate established by the Supreme Court. 21 ' Prohibiting demon-
strations of an entire group because selective members within this
group act in an illegal manner has in many instances been struck down
by the Court.2 12 As stated in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,'"
"[t]he right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection
merely because some members of the group may have participated in
conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected." 21 4 The in-
junction prohibited any demonstrations within the designated buffer
zones, including peaceful picketing and speeches by individuals acting
in concert with those named in the injunction. 2 5 Because the Court
has pronounced that a "blanket prohibition of association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims [would present) a real danger
that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired,"
Madsen argued that the injunction's provisions violated the First
Amendment.216
206. Id. at 2530.
207. Id. at 2529.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2530.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Brief for Petitioners at 24, 44, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
213. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
214. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982).
215. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994).
216. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961).
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The pro-life litigants attempted to drive home the point that the "in
concert" provision was unconstitutional by filing the writ for petition
of certiorari using Judy Madsen, Ed Martin, and Shirley Hobbs as the
Petitioners instead of Operation Rescue.21 7 While these individuals
were specifically named in the amended injunction, they claimed that
no evidence was ever presented linking them with Operation Rescue,
Operation Rescue National, IMPACT, Rescue America or the other
Central Florida pro-life organizations."' Thus, since no evidence
linked them to the illegal activities conducted by the organized pro-life
groups, trespassing, vandalism, etc., they were simply individuals ex-
pressing their views in a traditional public forum.
Comments made by Judge McGregor after the arrest of a number
of individuals further supported Madsen's objection to the "in con-
cert" phrase of the injunction. At a hearing the Judge stated:
The [term] in concert with means in concert with those who had
taken a certain position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic.
If you are saying that is the selective basis that the pro-choice were
not arrested when pro-life was arrested, that's the basis of that
selection. 219
Thus, the protestors' took the position that the "in concert" provi-
sion did not pertain to conduct or acts.2 Rather, it restrained indivi-
duals who held certain views, and was a viewpoint specific restriction
of their First Amendment rights.
2. The Women's Health Center View
The Women's Health Center's defense of the "in concert" provi-
sion began with the purpose of the injunction, which was to protect
an individual's right to enter or work at the Aware Woman Center for
Choice by limiting the ability of demonstrators to harass or block
these individuals.' '  Using the same transcripts that Madsen cited, pro-
choice advocates noted that at a number of demonstrations and "res-
cues" before the injunctive relief was granted arrested pro-life indivi-
duals would not state their given names and used the name John or
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 21 n.20, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114
S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880).
218. Id.
219. Transcript of Record at 105 (April 12, 1993, Appearance Hearings Held Before Judge
McGregor, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Seminole County, Florida).
220. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
221. Brief for Respondent at 18-19, 26, 33, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516 (1994).
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Jane Doe instead.* Given this reality, the "in concert" provision was
necessary because, without it, all demonstrators would claim the in-
junctive measures were inapplicable because they were not specifically
named. This would eviscerate the injunctive remedy and provide no
relief for the Melbourne clinic.
Additionally, the Women's Health Center emphasized that the
amended permanent injunction was not vague or overbroad simply
because it extended to those individuals acting in concert with the
named organizations. A vague law is constitutionally offensive be-
cause it "may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
'2 3
Given the facts of this case, the injunction was precisely tailored to
include those unidentifiable individuals who made the monthly or
weekly pilgrimage to the clinic to attempt to shut down its operation.
In the Center's view, the injunction did not encourage arbitrary en-
forcement. The standard for injunctive enforcement is not whether
there appears to be some discretion, since enforcement always "re-
quires the exercise of some degree of police judgment. ... ."24 In-
stead, the appropriate measure is whether the local law enforcement's
discretion has been adequately confined given the facts and history of
the specific injunction.3
The Women's Health Center's final contention was that the entire
question of the "in concert" provision was not properly before the
Court. 226 Because the three named petitioners, Judy Madsen, Ed Mar-
tin and Shirley Hobbs, were specifically identified in the amended in-
junction, they had no standing to question the impact or validity of
the "in concert" provision.227 Under similar circumstances, the Court
has reached such a conclusion and has declined to adjudicate the issue
of the precise reach of an injunctive order against nonparties. In Re-
gal Knitwear v. NLRB,22 the Court declined to entertain an "abstract
controversy" dealing with any nonparty potentially affected by the in-
junction. 29 Thus, the Center asserted, since all three of these indivi-
duals were named in the amended injunction, it specifically applied to
them and the acting "in concert" with provision was irrelevant.
222. See Appendix to Opinion, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516,
2550-52 (1994).
223. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
224. Id. at 114.
225. Brief of Respondent at 48, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516
(1994) (No. 93-880).
226. Id. at 43.
227. Id.
228. 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
229. Regal Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945).
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3. Issue Not Properly Before the Court
The Court agreed with the Women's Health Center's position that
the three petitioners were procedurally barred from raising an "in
concert" claim because all three were specifically named in the injunc-
tion. 30 Because all the petitioners were named, their claim was noth-
ing more than "an abstract controversy" over the use of the words in
the injunction and was not an issue properly before the Court. 23'
Thus, the Court found that Madsen and the other pro-life petitioners
lacked standing and briefly declined to analyze the abstract argu-
ments.
232
The Court also rejected petitioner's vague and overbroad based ar-
guments on similar grounds. 23 3 Because Madsen was a named party in
the amended injunction, she lacked standing to argue that the injunc-
tion was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 2 4 Furthermore, the
Court held that the "in concert" with provision did not prohibit any
conduct, but "[was] simply directed at unnamed parties who might
later be found to be acting 'in concert' with the named parties. ' 235 So,
in relatively brief fashion, the Court disposed of a rather lengthy sub-
stantive pro-life First Amendment argument on procedural grounds.
VI. THE MADSEN DISSENT
In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, rebutted the analysis and logic of the majority's opinion. 236
Justice Scalia was highly critical of the Court's decision to apply a
"new" level of analysis to injunctive remedies. 3 7 Justice Scalia also
disagreed with the majority that the core issue in this case was whether
the amended injunction was content based. 23 Concluding that the in-
junction applied only to the views of one particular group, Justice
Scalia found this viewpoint-specific injunction unconstitutional.
239
Yet, Justice Scalia asserted that because this First Amendment restric-
tion applied to a "disfavored class" of pro-life supporters instead of,
say, the NAACP, the Court invented a way to legitimize the injunc-
tion. 240 Justice Scalia began and concluded his dissent by stating that






236. Id. at 2534-50.
237. Id. at 2535, 2537-38.
238. Id. at 2539.
239. Id. at 2540.
240. Id. at 2535.
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the Court's effort at moderation in this case represented unprincipled,
shallow law-a dangerous tool which, given the right situation, could
be used to restrict the First Amendment rights of a disfavored
group.241
At the beginning of his dissent, Justice Scalia described a clinic vid-
eotape submitted by the pro-choice groups to support their contention
that the demonstrators were violating the rights of certain indivi-
duals. 242 Justice Scalia suggested that the demonstrators' conduct was
neither violent nor violated any persons rights. 243 He seemed to adopt
a "it's not as bad they say," perspective which permitted his conclu-
sion that the injunction was overly broad and prohibited more speech
than necessary.
Justice Scalia indicated three instances when speech-restricting in-
junctions might deserve strict scrutiny instead of a lesser form of con-
stitutional review. 244 First, Justice Scalia proposed that when one
group's ideas are suppressed as a result of judicial demand by an op-
posing group, regardless of whether the suppression is content or ac-
tion based, the judicial action requires strict scrutiny. 245 Second,
Justice Scalia argued that speech-restrictive injunctions made by a sin-
gle judge rather than a legislative body warrant strict scrutiny.
246
Finally, Justice Scalia pointed to precedent to support his belief that
speech-restrictive injunctions should be subjected to a much stricter
analysis than the Court applied in Madsen.247 Justice Scalia concluded
that the Court applied a more stringent analysis in NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co.2" and Carroll v. President & Commissioners of
Princess Anne,2 9 two prior cases addressing speech restrictions.20
Further, he contended the text of Carroll contradicts the Court's
Madsen decision.
25'
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by quoting Justice Jackson in
his Korematsu v. United States5 2 dissent. 2 3 By citing Korematsu,
Justice Scalia indicated that Madsen represents dangerous precedent.
241. Id. at 2535, 2549-50.
242. Id. at 2535-37.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2538-41.
245. Id. at 2538-39.
246. Id. at 2539.
247. Id. at 2541.
248. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
249. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
250. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2542.
251. Id.
252. 323 U.S. 214(1944).
253. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2549.
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The use of a more relaxed form of scrutiny when analyzing injunc-
tions that control speech is a dangerous trend to allow, according to




On the surface, Madsen is a fair opinion. Women choosing to exer-
cise their constitutionally protected right may now do so; Operation
Rescue still can protest at the location, but must remain across the
street from the Melbourne clinic. The Court rejected the injunctive
restrictions on the protestors First Amendment rights that appeared
overly broad and confining, while upholding the precise restrictions
that were specifically tailored to the situation.
Two examples taken from the Court's analysis of the amended in-
junction demonstrate the moderation and fairness of this opinion.
First, the Court rejected the images observable restriction while ac-
cepting the noise restriction placed on the pro-life demonstrators.
Here, the Court fairly pointed out that the Aware Woman Center for
Choice could avoid viewing the banners and pro-life signs by hanging
curtains in the clinic's windows. However, the clinic had no effective
way to stop the loud noise that permeated the clinic walls. Because of
the noise's adverse effects on the health of the patients, the Court held
that this form of expression could be constitutionally restricted.
Second, the Court closely analyzed the thirty-six foot buffer zone
and found that it passed constitutional muster only as applied on two
sides. While this distinction may appear to be insignificant given the
exact location of the Melbourne clinic, it does support the notion that
the Court fairly and critically reviewed the facts of the case in an ef-
fort to restrict the pro-life demonstrators only as far as necessary to
reasonably ensure access to the clinic.
The Madsen opinion can also be seen as a moderate victory for
First Amendment supporters. After concluding that the injunction
was content neutral, the Court could have simply applied a traditional
intermediate level scrutiny test to the injunction. The injunction's
time, place, and manner restrictions fell easily within the legitimate
governmental interests, and the injunction would have passed consti-
tutional scrutiny. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida followed this
approach. Instead, the Court introduced a heightened intermediate
level scrutiny standard. This higher standard provides greater protec-
tion to First Amendment rights because it increases the burden or
254. Id. at 2550.
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threshold an injunction must overcome to be constitutional. Specifi-
cally, to be constitutional, an injunction can burden no more speech
than is necessary, and the Court applied this standard in rejecting
some portions of the injunction, while upholding other portions.
Thus, by restricting the ability of judges to regulate speech and ex-
pression, the Madsen opinion appears to be both facially fair and a
positive step towards First Amendment protection.
An explanation of the Court's introduction of this new heightened
intermediate level standard can be found in the transcripts of the case.
The fact that Judge McGregor, the official author of the injunction, is
quoted in the transcripts as stating that this injunction was directed
specifically at pro-life demonstrators and their views is a sobering re-
ality. Justice Scalia felt compelled to include lengthy portions of the
transcript as an appendix to his dissent. When asked if the injunction
was issued to "apply only to people that were demonstrating that they
were pro-life," Judge McGregor responded, "In effect, yes."
Whether one agrees with the pro-life position or not, the ability of one
person to devise an order whose purpose is to specifically prohibit one
group from demonstrating is a frightening prospect.
The circuit court granted a temporary injunction on October 25,
1991 to prevent a well advertised October 26 demonstration. This tem-
porary injunction was not violated in any form, yet a permanent in-
junction was soon in place. The constitutional rights of women and
clinic employees to access a clinic facility should be protected. How-
ever, should not these rights be defended by law enforcement, instead
of through a judicial remedy? Instead of merely punishing the demon-
strators for their illegal conduct, one could argue that the ability of all
citizens to protest has been adversely affected by this decision.
Consider the following situations. Could a state judge in Georgia
prevent African-Americans from protesting the Georgia state flag in
front of the Olympic stadium in 1996 using Madsen as support for his
decision? Could the judge's order move the demonstrators to the
other side of the Olympic parking lot and still be constitutionally
valid? Might a pro-management lawyer now seize Madsen as support
to justify moving the union picket lines away from the store front
with the emplacement of a buffer zone because the protestors were
preventing access and intimidating potential customers? Could a phar-
maceutical company representative carrying a copy of Madsen in one
hand, and a brief case full of facts in the other, request from a judge
an order preventing an AIDS activist group from demonstrating
within thirty feet of the company's plant? One might argue that these
examples are not completely analogous to the Madsen case and that
19951
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subtle differences would surely impact on any decision. In reality,
however, obvious parallels exist between these examples and the Mad-
sen case, as does the uncertainty in the actual precedential value that
will be afforded the Madsen decision.
Technological advances and societal acceptance of such advance-
ments will move the center stage of the abortion battle from the street-
front of clinics to the privacy of bathroom medicine cabinets. Today,
technology exists that permits a woman to terminate a pregnancy by
using prescription medication. 25 This method will eventually become
available to the American public, and it will dramatically change the
landscape surrounding the harassment and First Amendment issues of
the abortion debate. What will remain however, is a Supreme Court
decision which many feel is questionable. Additionally, one should
not underestimate the associated effects of Madsen on the First
Amendment. While many people are quick to point out that the First
Amendment protects freedom of expression it also assists individuals
in identifying potential adversaries. We can identify enemies because
they are standing, marching, and chanting right in front of us. They
are not silently creeping through the night in a covert manner but can
be seen across the road during the day. Extreme caution must be exer-
cised when limiting one particular group's ability to demonstrate. The
obvious fear here is that the group will move "underground" with the
potential negative result of expressing its view through more violent
forms of protest. While the bombings and murders of doctors by
fringe pro-life groups are well documented, forcing the main stream
protestors off the street by limiting their ability to demonstrate may
ultimately result in additional violence. The Madsen opinion attempts
to address this problem by limiting in a fair and wise manner the abil-
ity of know demonstrators to disrupt and adversely effect the clinic's
activities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Madsen decision is a departure from the traditional three-level
analysis of First Amendment issues. Whether this is a poor, shallow
holding, or a wise, Solomonic decision will be determined over time.
Whether the Court's decision is "right" or "wrong" not only depends
on one's social or religious views regarding abortion, but on whether
one believes the principles of our legal system always take precedence
255. For two interesting articles on the use, effect, and impact of the abortion pill, RU 486,
see Jill Smolowe, New, Improved, and Ready for Battle, TIMa, June 14, 1994, at 48; David Van
Biema, But Will it End the Abortion Debate?, TIma, June 14, 1994, at 52.
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over reality. If one holds a fundamental belief that our law effects
people in real situations and should be a applied in a specific manner,
this decision represents a fine application of First Amendment juris-
prudence. Here, women were being prevented from entering a clinic to
receive abortions. If they did enter the clinic, they were subjected to
harassment by certain demonstrators. Now, these individuals are able
to enter the clinic and, while pro-life supporters cannot demonstrate
on the sidewalk in front of the clinic, they are only a street width
away.
However, if one believes not only that abortion is fundamentally
wrong, but also that the law must be applied in a strict manner con-
forming to a set of well-defined principles, the decision in Madsen is
insupportable. The Court appeared to have adopted a new standard
that, as Justice Scalia points out, has not been applied in other cases
involving speech-restricting injunctions. It seems that the pro-life
movement has been singled out. In situations where unions and the
NAACP have been allowed to protest, these religious groups are si-
lenced.
The decision in Madsen combines abortion rights and First Amend-
ment principles. When seen in terms of these competing interests, the
Court's compromise position is logical at best, understandable at
least. Recent increased anti-abortion violence reveals that the conflict
between the right of expression and the right to choose an abortion is
far from over. Time will tell if this decision, which impacts only one
Central Florida clinic, will be used as a foundation to limit the rights
of pro-life expression in a far broader context.
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